The article examines the problem of institutional support for the implementation of strategic decisions under conditions of information asymmetry, conflicts of interest, and limited observability of agents’ actions. It substantiates the argument that the effectiveness of strategizing depends not so much on the quality of goal formulation as on the organization’s capacity to design an incentive-compatible system of rules, allocation of rights, economic constraints, and verification procedures that minimize opportunistic behavior and imitative practices. Organizational and economic mechanisms are interpreted as a multilayered structure comprising normative-institutional, organizational-managerial, financial-economic, and information-analytical levels, whose coherence determines the sustainability of implementation. The category of “strategy execution debt” is introduced and analytically elaborated to describe the accumulated misalignment between declared priorities and the actual allocation of resources and managerial decisions. Attention is paid to the real options approach to budgeting as a tool of managed adaptability and portfolio discipline. It is demonstrated that the strategy implementation management system operates as strategy transformation of initiatives into performance indicators, managerial decisions, and corrective actions based on portfolio procedures, KPI systems, and digital monitoring instruments. The findings may be applied in designing sustainable strategy execution mechanisms in both corporate and public governance.